doubtful undertaking, which might at any time be converted into a disaster by the sudden appearance of allies to Is rael
from Judah, Tyre, or perhaps even from Assyria.
It was probably shortly after the commencement of the siege of Samaria, that Ben-hadad sent envoys to demand in
imperious terms the absolute submission of Ahab (1 Kings 20:2). At least so the latter seems to have understood it,
when he declared his readiness to agree to his enemy's terms. But whether Ben-hadad had from the first meant more, or
his insolence had grown with what he regarded as the necessities and fears of Ahab, the next day other heralds came
from Ben-hadad, requiring in terms of extreme and wanton insult, not only the surrender of Ahab, but that of Samaria;
and especially of the palaces of its nobility, for the avowed purpose of plunder. It was evident that Ben-hadad intended,
not the surrender of Ahab, but the destruction ("evil") of the capital, and the ruin of the whole land (ver. 7). Possibly the
apparently strange demand of Ben-hadad (ver. 6) may indicate a deeper scheme. To oblige Ahab formally to submit,
would be of comparatively small, at most, of only temporary use.
On the withdrawal of Ben-hadad the hostility of Israel would, as experience had shown, once more break forth under
Ahab, or some new military leader, and threaten Syria with the same or even graver danger than before. But if the spirit
of the leaders could be crushed by having their substance taken from them, then the chiefs of the people would not only
be detached from their native monarchy, which had proved powerless to protect them, but in future rendered dependent
on Syria, and hence led to seek the favor of Ben-hadad, instead of giving their allegiance to their own Israelitish rulers.
But the scheme was foiled by the clumsy frankness of its avowal. Ahab summoned to his council the elders of Israel.
He told them h ow on the previous day he had expressed to Ben-hadad his willingness to make absolute personal
submission and surrender of all that he possessed - as Josephus, no doubt, correctly puts into his mouth - for the sake of
their preservation and peace. But the new terms which Ben-hadad proposed involved the leaders of the people as well
as himself, and meant ruin equally to them all. In these circumstances, "the elders" counselled the absolute rejection of
the terms demanded. Their advice was ratified by a popular assembly (ver. 8). These measures of Ahab were wise.
Besides, the bearing of Ben -hadad must have indicated even to a ruler less astute than Ahab, the weakness and folly of
his opponent. And, instead of attacking the city, on the refusal of his terms, as he would have done had he been sure of
his army, Ben-hadad now only sent a message of ridiculously boastful threatening,41 to which Ahab replied with calm
dignity (vv. 10, 11).
Thus, for a time at least, Ahab seems in the school of adversity to have learned some of the lessons which his contact
with Elijah might have taught him. Besides, it is only reasonable to suppose that both the composition of the force
outside the city, and the utter demoralization of its leaders, were known in Samaria. A summer ca mpaign in Palestine
would have tried even the best disciplined troops. But the Syrian host contained a motley following of thirty-two
Eastern chiefs, who probably had little other interest in the campaign than the hope of plunder. It was an army
incoherent in its composition, and unwieldy from its very numbers. Hitherto their advance had been unchecked, and its
progress, no doubt, marked by the desolation of the country along their straggling line of march. Their easy success
would make them not only more reckless, but also unwilling to engage in serious fighting, especially in those hot and
enervating days, when their leaders lay in the cool shadow of their booths, indulging in drunken orgies. It was a
dissipated rabble, rather than an army.
Ben-hadad and his allies were engaged in a midday bout when the reply of Ahab to the Syrian challenge arrived.
Received under such circumstances, we scarcely wonder that it provoked the order of Ben-hadad to make immediate
preparation for an assault on the city. But in whatever these preparations consisted, - whether in the advance of siege
engines, or amassing of the troops,42 they could scarcely have been very effective, since all the Syrian chiefs continued
at their orgies, so that the hour of battle surprised them while incapacitated by intoxication (ver. 16). Matters were very
different within Samaria. There a prophet appeared,43 to announce not only deliverance from the LORD, but to point
its lesson in the contrast between the great multitude of the enemy, and the small number of Israel's host, by which they
were to be defeated.
This, with the view of showing to Ahab and to Israel that He was Jehovah, the living Covenant God, Who gave the
victory. Thus the teaching of Elijah on Mount Carmel was now to find its confirmation and application in national
blessing. And that the influence of that scene had not been, as Elijah had feared, only temporary and transient, appears
even from the presence of a prophet in Samaria, 44 and from the whole bearing of Ahab.